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
Abstract 
 
This paper relies on the ‘institutional debt rule’ implemented in Franc Zone countries to 
assess whether the structural vulnerability of these countries matter for their probability to 
enter into excessive indebtedness. This structural vulnerability is measured by retrospective 
‘Economic Vulnerability Index’ (EVI) recently computed jointly by the United Nations and 
Guillaumont et al., (2011). We observe evidence that the impact of ‘EVI’ is non-linear with 
respect to the probability of these countries to engage into excessive indebtedness and that, 
this effect appears to be the same for the two monetary areas belonging to the CFA Franc 
Zone countries: a rise of EVI induces a higher probability of excessive debt and for higher 
EVI, this probability declines. Consequently, international development institutions such as 
the Bretton Woods should take into account such vulnerability in their assessment of the 
adequate development policies and recommendations to these countries. 
 
Keywords: Structural Vulnerability; Public debt; unconditional logit model; linear probability 
model. 
JEL Classification: E60; H63; O10 ; C33 ; C35. 
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1. Introduction 
The issue of conducting fiscal policy in a monetary union is longstanding. Fiscal discipline 
and fiscal restructuring in a monetary area have been the subjects of many theoretical and 
empirical studies in the developed world, particularly in the European Union. For example, 
many studies have been conducted on the determinants of excessive deficits in the euro area 
(e.g. Castro, 2007; Tiryaki, 2008; Bayar, 2001, 2009; Huges-Hallet and Lewis, 2004, 2005). 
However, to our knowledge, such topics have been scarcely explored in the context of African 
monetary unions such as the CFA1 Franc Zone. This study aims to fill this gap. 
The CFA Franc Zone was created in 1945 during the Bretton Woods agreement and it 
currently comprises 14 Sub-Saharan African countries that belong to two separate monetary 
areas: WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union) and Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS). These countries are also classified as the most vulnerable 
developing countries to natural and external shocks (see Guillaumont, 2009, 2011). 
The present paper investigates whether this vulnerability of CFA Franc Zone countries 
matters for their public indebtedness. In other words, we rely on the budgetary institutional 
criteria (especially related to debt) set up in 1999 by WAEMU member countries and adopted 
by the end of 2001 by ECCAS members to explore whether the structural vulnerability of 
these countries matters for their excessive debt. 
The remainder of the paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 presents a brief 
overview of the institutional arrangements of the CFA Franc Zone’s monetary unions. Section 
3 summarises the state of the literature on the definition and measurement of the concept of 
‘economic vulnerability’ in order to derive our vulnerability index. Section 4 is devoted to 
some data analysis. Section 5 reviews the literature on debt sustainability, - since the setup of 
the institutional debt rule within the CFA Franc Zone aims at helping countries maintain a 
sustainable path of their public debt -, and sets the stage for the model used. Section 6, based 
on Section 5, describes the empirical model and discusses the expected signs of the variables 
and the econometrics technique. Section 7 presents the empirical results and Section 8 
concludes. 
 
                                                 
1
 CFA was defined as ‘Communauté Française d’Afrique’, but is now known as ‘Franc de la 
Communauté Financière d’Afrique’ for WAEMU area and ‘Coopération Financière en Afrique 
Centrale’ for ECCAS area.    

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2. Institutional arrangements of CFA Franc Zone countries 
Of the 14 Sub-Saharan African countries in the CFA Franc Zone, 12 were once French 
colonies. Formally, these countries belong to two separate monetary areas (WAEMU and 
ECCAS) and share two single currencies that hold the same acronym, the CFA Franc. Thus, 
the CFA Franc is issued and managed by two regional central banks: the Central Bank of 
West African States (known as BCEAO in French) and the Central Bank of Central African 
States (known as BEAC in French). These two CFA Francs were by design initially pegged at 
the same rate to the French Franc in 1948, and since 1999 to the Euro, following the creation 
of the euro area. Since the inception of the CFA Franc Zone, the French Treasury has 
guaranteed an unlimited convertibility of the CFA currencies and participated on the 
executive boards of the two regional central banks. The counterpart of this guarantee has been 
the obligation of each central bank to maintain a proportion of its official reserves (50% for 
BCEAO and 65% for BEAC) in an operation account at the French Treasury. 
In line with the adoption by the European Union of the Maastricht treaty2 in 1992, and 
recognising the crucial role of fiscal policy management in achieving macroeconomic 
stability, sustainable growth and macroeconomic convergence, both WAEMU and ECCAS 
have adopted a set of measures. In 1999, WAEMU member countries adopted a regional 
‘Convergence, Stability, Growth and Solidarity Pact’, which defines a set of primary and 
secondary convergence criteria pertaining to public finance, the real sector, the balance of 
payments and common currency (the list of these criteria can be found in Adedeji and 
Williams, 2007 or the ‘Note d’information n°127 of Banque de France3, 2010’). ECCAS, 
following the establishment of a multilateral committee in 1993, adopted by the end of 2001 a 
framework of convergence criteria that comprises the same primary criteria as WAEMU. 
Accordingly, the two monetary areas share a set of primary criteria within the CFA Franc 
Zone. However, while a directive imposes sanctions against a WAEMU country’s non-
compliance of a primary convergence criterion, such a sanction measure does not exist for 
ECCAS.  The primary criteria include:  
- The ratio of the basic fiscal balance to nominal GDP must be in balance or in surplus. 
                                                 
2
 This treaty comprises a set of rules reinforced in 1999 within the framework of the stability and 
growth pact for countries in the Economic and Monetary Union. 

3This note can be found at http://www.banque-
france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/Information_diverses/infoetlib/note127.pdf. 

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- The ratio of outstanding domestic and foreign debt to nominal GDP must not exceed 
 70%. 
- Average annual inflation rate cannot exceed 3% a year. 
- The non-accumulation of domestic and external arrears. 
The institutional debt rule is the core of our study. This rule, by constraining CFA Franc Zone 
countries to maintain their public debt under the threshold of 70%, acts as a debt sustainability 
rule. This is why Section 5 draws on the literature on debt sustainability to build the presented 
empirical model. Section 3 reviews the state of the literature on the definition and 
measurement of ‘economic vulnerability’. 
 
3. The concept of ‘economic vulnerability’ 
3.1 A literature review on the definition of ‘economic vulnerability’ 
The concept of ‘vulnerability’ refers to that of ‘risk’. There are several definitions associated 
with the concept of ‘risk’ depending on the disciplines where it is studied. Generally, 
vulnerability can be seen as the risk that a ‘system’ undergoes from negative change due to a 
‘perturbation’ (see e.g. Naudé et al., 2009).  
In economics, vulnerability is either associated with poverty where the concern is the risk of 
households falling into or remaining in poverty, or natural hazards and macro-level shocks 
where the concern is how the hazards adversely affect a country or region’s economy (see e.g. 
Naudé et al., 2009). Guillaumont (2009) highlights that the first type of vulnerability can be 
derived from the second one. Our paper focuses on the second kind of vulnerability: the 
‘economic or structural vulnerability’. 
The issue of ‘economic vulnerability’ was really raised for the first time (in 1990) by the 
Maltese Ambassador, his Excellency Ambassador Alexander Borg Olivier4 (see Maltese 
Government, 1990: 7). Since then, many conceptual and empirical studies5 have been 
conducted on that issue. More specifically, Briguglio (e.g. 2004), Briguglio and Galea (2003), 
Cordina, (2004a, b) and Briguglio et al., (2008) define economic vulnerability as a country’s 
proneness to exogenous shocks lying outside their control or a proneness to increased 
susceptibility of such a country to the adverse effects of these shocks’.  
                                                 
4
 He was the Permanent Representative of Malta to the United Nations. 
5
 The conceptual and empirical viewpoints of economic vulnerability are well documented in the 
literature (see e.g. Briguglio 1995, 2003; Atkins et al., 2000). Cordina and Farrugia (2005) also 
provide a summary on the measurement issue of the concept of ‘economic vulnerability’. 

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In the same vein, several studies of Patrick Guillaumont (see e.g. Guillaumont, 2009; 
Guillaumont and Cariolle, 2011) have been conducted on the issue of ‘economic 
vulnerability’ where he defines ‘the economic or structural vulnerability of a country as the 
risk of a (poor) country seeing its development hampered by the natural and external shocks it 
faces’. Two main types of exogenous shocks (in other words, two main sources of 
vulnerability) are therefore considered:  
- the environmental or ‘natural’ shocks which encompass, for instance, natural 
disasters (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions) and the more frequent climatic shocks 
(typhoons, hurricanes, droughts, floods, etc); 
- external (trade-and-exchange-related) shocks which comprise, for instance, slumps 
in external demand, world commodity price instability (and correlated instability 
of terms of trade), international fluctuations of interest rates, and so forth. 
Other domestic shocks such as unforeseen political changes are thus excluded from being 
exogenous.  
Meanwhile, all these authors highlight the difference between the concept of ‘economic 
vulnerability’ and that of ‘economic resilience’. For example, Briguglio (2008) defines the 
resilience as the policy-induced ability of an economy to recover from or adjust to the 
negative impact of adverse exogenous shocks and to benefit from positive shocks. Thus 
defined, economic resilience may take the form of higher savings and investments which may 
occur in the wake of pronounced uncertainty and may enable small island states to achieve 
high levels of economic development (Cordina, 2004). Guillaumont (2009) considers 
economic resilience as the capacity of a country to react to shocks. He underscores that this 
resilience depends more on current policy, is more easily reversed, and is less structural but 
may also comprise a structural element6.  
Briguglio (2003) develops the notion of the ‘Singapore Paradox’, according to which many 
small island states, in spite of their economic vulnerability, manage to generate a relatively 
high GDP per capita when compared to other developing countries. To explain this 
phenomenon, Briguglio (2003, 2004) takes the case of Singapore which experiences high 
rates of economic growth and high GDP per capita despite its high exposure to external 
                                                 
6
 According to Guillaumont (2009) a distinction close to this three components is given in Rodrik 
(1999) who, in looking at the risk of social conflict in countries facing external shocks, considers 
the individual severity of the shocks, the depth of latent social conflict (likely to increase the 
impact of the shocks), and the quality of conflict management institutions. 


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shocks. Hence, the ‘Singapore Paradox’ stems from the juxtaposition of economic 
vulnerability and economic (nurtured) resilience, where economic vulnerability was confined 
to inherent features which are permanent or quasi-permanent, while economic resilience was 
associated with man-made measures which enable a country to withstand or bounce back 
from the negative effects of external shocks.  
 
3.2 A literature review on the measurement of economic vulnerability 
In line with the definitions of economic vulnerability provided above, we summarise here the 
different measures of that concept. The propositions of vulnerability indices have mainly 
focused on the quantification of the special features of the countries by relying on indicators 
such as economic openness, export concentration, dependence on imports of energy and 
peripherality. Other approaches attempt to measure vulnerability in terms of the phenomenon, 
namely the variability of output and similar indicators.  
The first vulnerability index was proposed by Briguglio (1993) and is composed of three 
variables: the exposure to foreign economic conditions, insularity and remoteness, and 
proneness to natural disasters. This index has been the subject of several modifications in 
1995, 1997, and updated by Briguglio and Galea in 2003. Other authors such as Chander 
(1996) and Wells (1996) follow the methodology adopted by Briguglio (1995) and propose a 
vulnerability index which remains to a certain extent in line with Briguglio (1997)’s. Wells 
(1997) revised its measure of vulnerability and uses a methodology that departs from the 
previous ones by relying on the idea that ‘vulnerability manifested in instability in economic 
growth’. He then uses regression analysis to build its index. Atkins et al. (1998) also adopts 
the econometric analysis and show evidence that economic vulnerability captured by ‘output 
volatility’ depends mainly on the export dependency ratio, the merchandise export 
diversification and the vulnerability to natural disasters. Crowards (2000) also contributes to 
that literature by suggesting an index of economic vulnerability for developing countries 
which is similar to the previous ones, but is rather composed of more variables. In line with 
Wells’ (1997) study, the Committee for Development Policy (CDP)7 (2000) of the United 
Nations (UN) developed a composite index in order to identify the causes of vulnerability of 
least developed countries (LDCs). By capturing vulnerability through economic growth 
instability, this index is a weighted average of five variables, namely the share of 
manufacturing and modern services in GDP, merchandise export concentration ratio, 
                                                 
7
 This committee was previously called Committee for Development Planning. 

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instability of agricultural production, instability of exports of goods and services and 
population size. The weights are obtained through an econometric analysis where the impact 
of each economic indicator quoted above on economic growth is examined. All these studies 
convey the same message according to which small states are inherently more vulnerable. 
However, Gonzales (2000) criticizes these studies, arguing that their results they lead to 
considerable variations and contradictions due to the differences of the parameters and the 
methodologies employed by them.  
Following the renewal growing concern over macroeconomic vulnerability of least developed 
countries and the demand of these countries to build an adequate vulnerability indicator which 
should be taken into account in the design of international development policies, the CDP has 
developed and progressively refined, after successive revisions (2003, 2006 and 2009) an 
economic vulnerability index which captures vulnerability caused by structural factors. The 
structural economic vulnerability employed in this study referred to the so-called 
‘retrospective Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI)’ jointly calculated on an annual basis by 
the FERDI8 (see Cariolle, 2011; Guillaumont and Cariolle, 2011) with the UN/United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). This indicator covers 128 developing 
countries over the period 1975–2008 (unbalanced panel data) and has the advantage of being 
simple, transparent and parsimonious. Moreover, several multilateral development banks are 
exploring whether to move from their traditional indicator to EVI for aid allocation (see 
Guillaumont, 2011, for more details).  
This ‘economic vulnerability’ is a result of three components: (i) the size and frequency of the 
exogenous shocks, either observed (ex post vulnerability) or anticipated (ex ante 
vulnerability); (ii) exposure to shocks; and (iii) the capacity to react to shocks, or resilience. 
Therefore, structural vulnerability (that is, the EVI), which results from factors that are 
independent of a country’s current political will is different from the vulnerability deriving 
from policy, which results from recent policy choices. In other words, an index of structural 
economic vulnerability is related to structural factors—not policy factors—that are beyond 
the present control of the country and which also influence global vulnerability, mainly 
through resilience (Guillaumont, 2009). This structural vulnerability index is a composite 
                                                 
8
 FERDI is the ‘Fondation pour les Etudes et Recherches sur le Développement International’. 
The method of retrospective EVI’s calculation can be found in details in Cariolle (2011) and 
descriptive statistical analysis on the retrospective EVI can be found in Guillaumont (2011), and 
Guillaumont and Cariolle (2011). This is why we do not find it useful to replicate this statistical 
analysis here and refer the readers to those articles. 

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index of ‘shocks’ and ‘exposure to shocks’; both indicators are equally weighted9. We display 
below the structure of the retrospective EVI (henceforth, EVI) where the weights of indices 
are in brackets. 
 
Structure of the EVI 
-Smallness (50%)
-Location Index (Remoteness) (50%)
Exposure Index (50%)
-Specialization Index (Merchandise Export concentration and 
share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries) (25%)
Shock Index 






-Natural Shock Index(Homelessness due to natural disasters; instability of 
(50%)     agriculture production) (50%)
-Trade Shock Index (Instability of exports of goods and services) (50%) 







 





Source: Guillaumont et al. (2011) 
 
4. Data analysis 
Our study covers a sample of 14 CFA Franc Zone countries10 over the period 1980–2008. 
Within this group, eight countries belong to WAEMU11 and six to ECCAS12. Graph 1 in the 
Appendix compares the evolution of average total public debt with the average economic 
vulnerability index (EVI) for CFA Franc Zone countries. This graph suggests a strong 
correlation between average EVI and average total public debt over time. 
Graph 2 illustrates the empirical distribution of the duration of ‘non-excessive debt’ spells, the 
latter being the time spent by a given CFA Franc Zone country within the state of ‘non-
excessive debt’ (i.e., before entering ‘excessive debt’). This analysis provides an insight into 
the durations of ‘non-excessive debt’ spells for this monetary zone. We plot on the x-axis the 
observed spell lengths and on the y-axis the proportion of observations where the observed 
spell of non-excessive debt exceeds a given length. Note that of the total of 50 spells, there 
are 21 spells of ‘excessive debt’, or 42% of all spells. 
 
                                                 
9
 See for example Guillaumont and Cariolle (2011) for a discussion on the weight of indicators. 
10
 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
11
 WAEMU countries include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal and Togo. 
12
 ECCAS include Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea and Gabon. 

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Graph 1: Comparative evolution of the Average Total Public debt and Average EVI of CFA 
Franc Zone Countries 
 
 
Source: The Author Calculation based on IMF’s data on Public Debt.  
 
Graph 2: The empirical distribution of the Duration of ‘Non-Excessive Debt Spells’ in CFA 
Franc Zone countries 
 
Source: The Author calculation is based on IMF’s data on Public Debt. Figures in the graph represent the percentage of spells 
duration until the entry into excessive debt state in CFA Franc Zone where the observed spells exceed a given length.   
 
Graph 2 also suggests for the CFA Franc Zone that among the spells of non-excessive debt 
and over the period 1980–2008, 24.14% enter into a state of “excessive debt” after the first 
year of non-excessive debt. After five years, more than half (58.6%) of spells enter into a state 
of ‘excessive debt’. The figure is approximately 76% after 8 years and approximately 96.55% 
after 14 years. Note that no spell lasts between 9 and 11 years and between 15 and 28 years. 
In addition, only one spell lasts 12 years, one, 13 years, four spells last 14 years and finally 
only one lasts 29 years. We can thus conclude that whereas a small proportion of spells of 
non-excessive debt’ are long-lasting, the most important ‘non-excessive debt’ spells last only 
a few years. Thus, CFA Franc Zone countries seem to display a high tendency to enter an 
‘excessive debt’ state. Section 5 presents the traditional accounting mathematical model of the 
sustainability of public finances. 
 

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5. Sustainability of public finances 
Since the purpose of our study is to examine the effect of economic vulnerability on the total 
public debt, we start with the standard public finances sustainability model and then derive 
the appropriate model that will help us perform our regressions. Although there is no 
consensus among economists regarding the public debt threshold that maintain the public debt 
path sustainable, the empirical literature distinguishes between three main approaches13 used 
to assess the public debt sustainability. These approaches have been discussed in IMF (2003) 
(see also Vera, 2009).  
The first and most common approach starts from the basic accounting identity (or Domar’s 
approach) and links the changes in the debt stock to public sector revenues and expenditures. 
According to this approach, fiscal policy is sustainable if it delivers a stable ratio of public 
debt to GDP. In other words, if the actual primary balance is less than the debt stabilizing 
balance, current fiscal policy that implies an increasing ratio of public debt to GDP is viewed 
as unsustainable. This approach allows calculating the so-called “debt stabilizing primary 
balance” which is the primary balance that would make the debt-to-GDP ratio stable. Hence, 
the degree of the needed fiscal adjustment stems from the difference between the actual and 
debt stabilizing primary balance. The second approach (a more flexible one) refers to the 
called Present-Value Constraint (PVC) approach. It assesses the debt sustainability within the 
context of the broader objectives and constraints of the fiscal policy decision-making process. 
For example, it consists in estimating fiscal policy reaction functions where the relationship 
between fiscal policy instruments and fiscal policy objectives (such as the stabilization of 
output fluctuations, the maintenance of debt sustainability) is examined. Hence, if the primary 
balance responds positively to public debt, this generally implies that fiscal policy is 
consistent with long-run solvency (see Bohn, 1998). The third approach to assessing public 
debt sustainability is to examine whether the government is “overborrowing”, that is, its debt 
stock is higher than the present discounted value of its expected future primary surpluses. 
However, irrespective of the conceptual approach adopted, the fundamental block of the fiscal 
sustainability corresponds to a simplification of the government budget constraint (Vera, 
2009).  
                                                 
13
 Note that the World Bank and IMF have in the last few years defined the concept of public 
finance sustainability (or ‘debt sustainability’ according to their used expression) as in first time, a 
group of indicators and lately as a set of threshold (see IMF, 2002a).    

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By assuming that the government finances its deficit only by issuing debt (that is, other 
financing items such as seigniorage revenue, privatization proceeds, and the sales of public 
assets are excluded), this mathematical model can be written as follows (see Vera, 2009): 
)()( 1 φτ −−−=∆ −tt bgib  (1) where tb denotes the ratio of the total public debt to GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) and ∆  represents the symbol of variation; ti  is the real interest rate; g is 
the real GDP growth rate; τ and φ  are respectively the ratio of total tax revenue over GDP 
and the ratio of total government consumption (excluding interest payments on the total 
public debt) over GDP.     
The equation (1) shows that if the primary surplus ratio is equal to zero, the debt-to-GDP ratio 
will grow or shrink at the rate )( gi − , within a framework where it is assumed that there is a 
level beyond which the debt-to-GDP ratio cannot or should not rise. Under this situation, 
unless there is a sufficient amount of primary budget surplus, the public debt ratio increases 
when the real effective interest rate on government debt exceeds the growth rate of GDP (that 
is, when the growth-adjusted real effective rate is positive). In other terms, the Domar’s 
condition for debt stability (and thus fiscal sustainability) can be held when the real GDP 
growth rate is higher than the real interest rate, even if the primary balance continues to be 
just zero.     
To estimate the effect of structural economic vulnerability on public debt in CFA Franc Zone 
countries, we rely in this paper on the mathematical model of fiscal sustainability underlying 
that fundamental block. 
 
6. Model specification 
In the previous model of fiscal sustainability, we assume that the budget deficit is financed 
only by debt creation. We now relax this hypothesis and consider the additional financing 
items that can add to government revenue (non-tax revenues) such as seigniorage revenue, 
privatization proceeds, and the sales of public assets. To take into account such items in the 
equation (1), we define the primary balance not as the difference between tax revenue and the 
government spending, but rather as the difference between the overall government revenue 
(excluding grants) - comprising several items (non-tax revenue) -  and non interest (primary) 
expenditure. 
Our model relies thus on the equation (1) augmented with our variables of interest (the EVI or 
its components), and other control variables which are likely to influence both the variables of 
interest and the dependent variable (the overall public debt).  

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We first present our model specification and discuss the expected signs of the covariates and 
finally the econometric technique. 
 
6.1 The model specification  
      In this sub-section, we describe the model that allows us to examine the effect of the 
structural vulnerability of CFA Franc Zone countries in their probability of excessive 
indebtedness. More specifically, the model examines the probability of a country breaching 
the 70% of GDP debt rule (that is, leading to excessive public debt). The structural model is 
stipulated as follows:   
* '
* *
it it=1 if >70%, and =0 if <=70%
it it it
it it
y x
y y y y
β ε = +


     
where i = 1,…N =14, denotes the country index and t = 1980-2008, denotes the period (year) 
index; *y  is an unobserved outcome; ity represents the excessive debt status: 1ity =  if in a 
country i of the CFA Franc Zone at the year t, the government incurs an excessive public 
debt, that is, its total debt-to-GDP ratio is equal to or higher than 70%; 0ity = , otherwise. The 
vector itx  represents the structural economic vulnerability variables (that is, the EVI or its 
components) as well as a set of other control variables which act as (economic) resilience-related 
variables which are supposed to influence the impact of EVI on the probability of excessive debt. 
These variables include the fiscal balance (in percentage of GDP), the real GDP growth rate, the 
terms of trade, the real effective exchange rate, the grants (as a percentage of GDP), the inflation 
rate (captured here through the GDP deflator), and a dummy variable representing the period 
since the entrance into force of the ‘‘Pact of Convergence, Stability, Growth and Solidarity’’ 
within the zone franc. The definition and the source of these variables are provided in the 
Appendix A.  itε  is an error term. 
 
6.2 Discussion on the expected signs of the explanatory variables 
Before starting the discussion of the expected effects (signs) of our explanatory variables, let 
us highlight one important pitfall regarding both the linear and the nonlinear model. Indeed, 
for the model’s parameters to be consistent and efficient, our regressors should be 
predetermined with respect to the dependent variable. In our case, to avoid any suspicion of 
endogeneity issue related to simultaneity bias between certain regressors and the dependent 
variable, we use in the model where it appears necessary the lagged values of the explanatory 
variables (especially for the variables ‘fiscal balance’, ‘real economic growth’, ‘inflation’, 

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grants-to-GDP ratio’ and ‘real effective exchange rate’). While this precaution could at least 
mitigate the simultaneity bias in any model like ours, in our specific case, the dependent 
binary variable is defined by institutional rules rather than by economic variables. As a result, 
there is likely no simultaneity bias and, the endogeneity issue will not thus be a problem. 
Nevertheless, to take into account such eventual problem along with the delay in processing 
some economic data, we do consider the previously quoted one year lagged variables in our 
different model specifications. 
 
Now what about the expected effect of each explanatory variable? 
The EVI’s variable 
In analyzing the effect of economic vulnerability on economic growth, Cordina (2004a, b) 
shows that increased risk can adversely affect economic growth as the negative effects of 
downside shocks would be commensurately larger than those of positive shocks. Furthermore, 
he presents a conceptual application of the “Singapore Paradox” approach and shows 
evidence that in response to a situation of vulnerability, saving and capital formation in an 
economy can be important sources of resilience. Guillaumont (2009) also discusses the effects 
of the (retrospective) EVI on economic growth and poverty and concludes that the EVI 
reduces economic growth and, through the latter, exerts deleterious effects on the pace of 
poverty reduction. These impacts occur through the channels of export earnings instability, 
the primary instabilities (especially through their effects on public finances or via the passed 
through of price fluctuations to producers), political instability, the smallness of the country, 
the structure of the economy and the location of the country.  
More recently, Ferrarini (2009) re-assesses the analysis underlying the New Debt 
Sustainability Framework (NDSF) endorsed by both the Bretton Woods Institutions (the IMF 
and the World Bank) - which guides the borrowing decisions of Low-Income Countries. This 
re-evaluation consists in testing the significance and the reliability of the World Bank’s CPIA 
or the governance indicators as predictors of debt distress episodes across LICs. He obtains 
strong evidence that factors of illiquidity and structural vulnerability14 are more suitable 
predictors of the occurrence of debt distress episodes across Low-Income Countries (LICs). 
Thus, by challenging the NDSF prospects whose aim is to solve the long-standing debt crisis 
                                                 
14
 The Economic Vulnerability Indicator (EVI) used is that of United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs – Division of Sustainable Development. 

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involving many of the LICs, the author concludes that “the NSDF is bound to distort aid 
allocation away from the country-specific circumstances which truly matter for the 
achievement of debt sustainability”.  
In our case, we argue the following: the structural vulnerability, by reducing tax revenue 
(unless the government increases taxes after an exogenous shock or when its exposures to 
shocks rises, though such measure is politically sensitive and difficult to implement) and 
increasing government spending is expected to increase the budget deficit. We hypothesise 
that, irrespective of its effect on the public finances (the budget balance), the structural 
vulnerability of a country is expected to increase its public indebtedness and thus to raise the 
probability of excessive indebtedness (especially in the case of CFA Franc Zone countries). 
However, one can think that when a government experiences a higher structural vulnerability 
of its economy, instead of borrowing even at low cost to cope with the additional financial 
needs induced by such rise in structural vulnerability, it can rely on non-costly financial 
means such as the privatisation proceeds, the seigniorage15 and the sale of its assets 
(buildings, infrastructure, mineral deposits, and various forms of liquid reserves) (Vera, 
2009). In such cases an obtained positive effect of EVI on the accumulation of public debt or 
on the probability of excessive debt may cancel out the effect of the fiscal balance (the 
coefficient of the variable capturing the ‘the fiscal balance’ may not be statistically 
significant), since in the latter, we include tax revenue as well as other forms of non-tax 
revenues.  
One can also think that countries facing structural vulnerability benefit from (temporary) debt 
forgiveness from their creditors, the extra revenues are used to cope with the shocks. In such 
situation, we can observe in the regressions a statistically significance of both the coefficient 
of the fiscal balance and that of the EVI. 
We also conjecture that there exists a nonlinear (in the form of curve-linear or inverted U-
shape) relationship between EVI/or its components and the probability of excessive debt and 
that, whether the membership of a CFA Franc Zone country to WAEMU or ECCAS matters 
for such non-linearity. The hypothesis underlying the inclusion of both the ‘EVI’/or its 
components and the square of EVI/or the square of its components is the following: When 
facing a rise in their vulnerability stemming either from exposure increases or shocks rises, or 
                                                 
15
 Note however that only the ECCAS countries can use seigniorage to finance their deficits, as 
this measure is forbidden in WAEMU area.   

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both, a CFA Franc Zone country has several options apart from resorting to indebtedness to 
accommodate the additional costs induced by a such rise in structural vulnerability: the first 
option is to adjust its fiscal policies by either increasing taxes or reducing public spending or 
adopting both measures (taxes rise and expenditures reduction), although, as we mention 
above, these measures could be politically difficult to implement; the second option consists 
on using the non-costly means of financing (previously quoted) that are available to them. 
Note however that only the ECCAS countries can use seigniorage to finance their 
expenditures as this measure is forbidden in WAEMU area. The third option is for these 
countries to seek for debt relief granted by the creditors.  
Therefore, we can have two main expectations regarding the nonlinearity of the EVI with 
respect to the probability of excessive debt in CFA Franc Zone countries: 
4 Hypothesis 1: we expect the public debt not to be affected or even to be reduced in the 
first stages of EVI increases (in the cases of fiscal adjustment or drawing on non-costly means 
of financing or debt relief), but as EVI becomes higher, these countries will have no choice 
but to resort to domestic and/or external debt. As a result, we expect a positive sign of the 
variable ‘EVI square’ (or the square of the components) and a negative sign of the coefficients 
associated to ‘EVI’ or its components. These coefficients may be statistically insignificant. 
4 Hypothesis 2: we also expect the likelihood of excessive public debt to rise in the first 
stages of EVI (if the countries choose to borrow internally or abroad to accommodate the EVI 
increases) and then to decline for higher EVI, because of the debt relief granted by creditors 
or the use of non-costly financial resources or also the adoption of fiscal adjustment measures. 
Hence, the sign of ‘EVI’ or its components will be positive and that of its square or its 
components’ square will be negative.        
 
The fiscal balance: as mentioned above, we expect an improvement in the fiscal balance to 
reduce the overall public debt and thus the probability of excessive debt. If the EVI (or its 
components) effect translates through the fiscal balance, the impact of the latter on public debt 
will be statistically nil. However, we acknowledge that a statistically nil effect of fiscal 
balance may not necessarily be due to the presence of the EVI or its components in the model, 
but may also be explained by the effect of other control variables of the model that influence 
the fiscal balance (e.g. economic growth; the terms of trade).    
 
The real GDP growth: the indebtedness of a country is expected to rise following losses in 
output, that is, lowering of real GDP growth (see also Barro, 1979). Accordingly, the real 
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GDP growth is expected to be negatively associated with the build-up of public debt and 
accordingly, with the likelihood of excessive debt.  
 
The real effective exchange rate 
The real effective exchange rate (REER) indicates a country’s competitiveness. In our case, a 
rise in the REER means an appreciation and a decline means depreciation. The effect of the 
real effective exchange rate on the overall public debt of a country depends on its effect on the 
domestic and external debt.  
Regarding the domestic debt, on the supply side, its issuance may be easier to countries when 
the currency is appreciating because the expected appreciation allows prudent policymakers to 
hide the implicit insurance premium embedded in domestic currency borrowing (Caballero 
and Cowan, 2006; Panizza et al., 2011). On the demand side, a real appreciated exchange rate 
is, at any given interest rate, likely to discourage the demand of domestic currency bonds as 
investors may foresee an ex-post appreciation of the foreign currency rate (a real depreciation 
of local currency) (see also Panizza et al., 2011). Furthermore, in terms of valuation effects, a 
real effective exchange rate appreciation (depreciation) automatically induces a higher (lower) 
domestic indebtedness of the government.  
With respect to the external public debt, the effect of REER changes on its build-up is also 
ambiguous. In fact, a real exchange rate depreciation will lead to a declining of the external 
debt stock if the induced rise in export earnings of this depreciation is sufficiently enough to 
service the external debt; otherwise, the depreciation of the REER will result in a rise of 
external indebtedness (Craigwell et al., 2010; see also Ng’eno, 2000), and hence the 
likelihood of excessive debt. 
Overall, we cannot conclude a priori about the effect of REER changes on the probability of 
excessive debt. 
 
The terms of trade 
An improvement in terms of trade (an increase in the relative price of exportables for a 
country) is likely to increase the export (foreign) revenues of the beneficiary country, reduce 
current expenditures and therefore improve the fiscal balance. Note that the reduction effect 
of public expenditures owe to the terms of trade improvement appears through a relative 
decline in the price of inputs (in the cases where imports represent an important share of 
expenditures - which is usually observed in many developing countries and a fortiori, in CFA 
Franc Zone countries). Furthermore, such improvement in terms of trade, by increasing the 
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economic growth may also reduce the need for social assistance from government and in fine, 
add to the reduction of current expenditures. Thus, an improvement in terms of trade is 
expected to be positively related to lower external and /or domestic borrowing and by the 
same token, to a low probability of excessive debt.  
Conversely, a decline in terms of trade, by lowering revenue, increasing (substantially) public 
spending and thus worsening the fiscal balance, will likely result in higher total public debt. 
As a result, the likelihood of excessive debt will rise. The positive effect of such terms of 
trade deterioration on public expenditures translated through for example, the rise of social 
assistance needs, and the high demand by public enterprises of support from the government 
because they cannot adjust their pricing policies to changes in export and import prices. 
 
The grants  
According to Cline (2003), in low-income countries (LICs), the grants elements (foreign 
grants, which represent a substantial fraction of GDP), are available to pay some part (or all) 
of the interest due on debt, and can consequently modify our previous debt sustainability. This 
is why we include in our model specification the foreign grants as a percentage of GDP. We 
thus expect the grants to alleviate the burden of indebtedness of developing countries—that is, 
to exert a negative effect on chance of entering into excessive debt. But we can also 
hypothesise that the higher the grants are for a developing country, the less it will be inclined 
to correctly manage its public finances to avoid unsustainable debt situations. In such 
instances, the grants will exert a positive effect on the total public debt. 
 
The inflation rate 
The impact of inflation on the public debt depends on how the latter is distributed among 
domestic and foreign creditors. In the case of developing countries and specifically in CFA 
Franc Zone countries, where usually a substantial part of the public debt is denominated in 
foreign currency, the inflation impacts directly the domestic debt-to-GDP ratio and indirectly 
the ratio of external debt to GDP through the real effective exchange rate.  
A rise in inflation erodes the real value of the domestic debt hold by creditors and the 
effective debt ratio, unless all domestic debt is indexed to prices or foreign currencies (though 
according to Panizza et al., (2011), in such cases inflation can debase indexed to prices if the 
government tinkers with the price index), a government can inflate away the domestic public 
debt by money creation, with the result of this inflating away of debt depending on the share 
of debt that is indexed to inflation. Although such policy measure can be implemented in 
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ECCAS, it can’t in WAEMU (see above). Panizza et al. (2011)16 also point out the 
exceptional case where inflation can lead to a rise of public debt: in the case of a country 
facing a real appreciation (that is, where inflation outweighs the currency depreciation) and 
where a large share of domestic debt is indexed to inflation, the valuation effects will create a 
positive link between inflation and domestic currency debt.  
 
6.3 Discussion on the choice of appropriate econometric technique 
Since our dependent variable is binary (a dummy), we have to choose between two kinds of 
models: a linear probability model (LPM) and a non-LPM (logit or probit model). Whereas in 
LPMs, the probability of success and failure is considered to be a linear function of the 
covariates, in logit and probit models, the expected probability is an increasing non-linear 
function of the explanatory variables. However, compared with nonlinear models, there are 
several concerns regarding LPMs.  
First, the marginal effect induced by a unit of variation of each covariate in an LPM is 
constant, whereas in nonlinear models it varies with each unit.  
Second, in contrast to non-LPMs, the predicted probabilities of success or failure in an LPM 
may lie out of the interval [0,1]. On one side, Wooldridge (2002: 455) highlights that ‘if the 
main purpose is to estimate the partial effect of the explanatory variables on the response 
probability, averaged across the distribution of these covariates, then the fact that some 
predicted values are outside the unit interval may not be very important. The linear 
probability model needs not provide very good estimates of partial effects at extreme values 
of the covariates’. In the same vein, Cameron and Trivedi (2005: 495) mention that ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimations of such models provide a good guide to which variables are 
statistically significant. Ree and Nillesen (2009: 306–307) also emphasise that ‘the 
probit/logit and LPM often produce rather similar outcomes because the conditional 
distribution function tends to ‘look’ rather linear around its expected value, while at the same 
time, most draws from any conditional distribution are ‘close’ to the expected value’. On the 
other side, Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) point out that OLS estimates of LPMs, where the 
predicted probabilities are outside the unit interval, may lead to biased and inconsistent 
estimates. They propose the sequential least squares (SLS) procedure as a way of remedying 
                                                 
16
 These authors recognize however that such situation is exceptional and argue it will likely be 
dominated by the case where inflation impacts negatively the domestic debt, in the absence of 
financial repression. 

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this problem. These iterative procedure first trims from the data those OLS estimate 
observations with predictions lying outside the unit interval. Based on these estimations, the 
data are trimmed again and the model re-estimated. The procedure is repeated until no 
predictions are outside the unit interval and the SLS estimates are thus obtained. 
Third, the problem of heteroskedasticity is likely to arise, leading to unbiased but inefficient 
coefficients (i.e., the standard errors are not valid for constructing confidence intervals and t-
statistics). Weighted least squares are said to provide efficient estimates (Mullahy, 1990), but 
hold the disadvantage of having worse finite sample properties than OLS; further, the 
inferences based on asymptotic theory can be misleading (Alton and Segal, 1996)17. To 
overcome this difficulty, we use OLS with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (i.e., 
White’s correction of heteroskedasticity). 
Despite the above-mentioned drawbacks, LPMs have the particular advantage of facilitating 
the interpretation of the coefficients of interaction variables, whereas such an interpretation is 
not straightforward in logit or probit models. Indeed, Ai and Norton (2003)18 show that the 
marginal effect of an interaction term in nonlinear models, as provided by standard 
econometrics packages, may hold the wrong sign and significance and, consequently, cannot 
be interpreted as such. Greene (2010) challenges the way of interpreting Ai and Norton’s 
(2003) results and notes that ‘the process of statistical testing about partial effects, and 
interaction terms in particular, produces generally uninformative and sometimes contradictory 
and misleading results. The mechanical reliance on statistical measures of significance 
obscures the economic, numerical content of the estimated model’ (p. 295). He recommends 
performing the analysis not only through statistical procedures (see Greene, 2010 for details) 
but also by graphical presentations. He also emphasises the need to take into account the units 
of measurement when interpreting the partial effects of continuous variables, as the partial 
effect (per unit change) can be misleading.  
Kolasinski and Siegel (2010) also criticise Ai and Norton’s (2003) interpretation of the 
interaction term. They first contend that in Ai and Norton’s (2003) results ‘it is difficult to 
interpret the sign of interaction term coefficient because for some observations, the cross 
                                                 
17
 See also Wooldridge (2002: 455), who discourages the use of weighted least squares in LPM 
when the predicted probabilities lies outside the range [0,1]. 
18
 According to these authors, the interaction effect is based on cross-partial derivatives with 
respect to the two interacted variables, which makes the sign and significance of the interaction 
term different for observations. They thus recommend relying on these derivatives and using the 
Delta method to assess the statistical significance of the marginal effect associated to the 
interaction term. 
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partial derivative of the probability of occurrence with respect to interacted covariates can 
have the sign opposite to that of the interaction term coefficient’. They argue that this is 
because of a mechanical saturation effect19, which is irrelevant for researchers primarily 
concerned with proportional marginal effects. For such researchers, small changes in 
probability are more important near the boundaries than they are near the centre. Kolasinski 
and Siegel (2010) conclude that the interaction term coefficient (provided by nonlinear logit 
or probit regressions) remains a valid measure of interaction because it is already purged of 
the saturation effect. Consequently, they suggest researchers who are not concerned with the 
saturation effect, use it as such, while others (those for whom the mechanical saturation effect 
is important) use Ai and Norton’s (2003) measure of interaction. 
In the case of only one interaction effect, researchers may use the easy fixes provided by 
standard econometrics packages (e.g., the use of ‘inteff’ ado-files in Stata) or the Delta 
method to obtain the interaction term in nonlinear models. However, these fixes become 
unusable in the case of double interaction effects (‘inteff3’ ado-files are available in Stata for 
the interaction of three dummies, but not for dummy(ies) and continuous variable(s)). 
Moreover, even using the Delta method to calculate standard errors, the computation becomes 
burdensome (as in our case here) with many interactions, especially with covariates20 having 
high-order terms. 
For all these reasons and given the ongoing discussion on the best way of obtaining good 
interaction terms and interpreting them in nonlinear models, we rely in this study on nonlinear 
models to perform our analysis and only use LPMs for interpreting interaction terms. In other 
words, the nonlinear model estimations allow us to interpret solely the non-interacted 
variables, while the LPM estimation allows us to interpret the coefficients of the interaction 
variables. 
However, we still have three concerns. The first concern relates to the choice of fixed or 
random effects to model unobserved heterogeneity, the second focuses on which nonlinear 
                                                 
19
 Kolasinski and Siegel (2010) explain why saturation effects might not be economically relevant 
in certain contexts. They particularly show that, under general conditions, the saturation effect 
guarantees that the Ai and Norton measure of interaction will have the opposite sign from the 
interaction term coefficient, as one or more of the covariates take on extreme values. 
20
 In our case, these interaction variables include the square of this covariate, the interaction of 
this square with a dummy variable and the interaction of this covariate with another explanatory 
continuous variable of the model. 

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model (logit or probit) is suitable for our analysis and the third relates to the handling of 
temporal duration dependence. 
4 First, we use fixed effects, which capture heterogeneity among countries as well as the 
likely importance of unobservables correlated with the error term in determining the 
probability of excessive public debt, rather than random effects for two main reasons. First, 
since our sample is composed of heterogeneous countries, state-invariant and unmeasured 
factors (e.g., political, financial institutions, the degree of creditworthiness, etc.) are likely to 
be correlated with the error term in determining the evolution of the public debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Second, our macro panel contains the whole population of CFA Franc Zone countries (i.e., 
WAEMU and ECCAS countries) rather than a random sample from a much larger universe of 
countries where the use of random effects may be more suitable. 
4 Second, estimating standard dummy variables in a fixed-effects logit model21 using the 
unconditional Maximum Likelihood method can pose the incidental parameters problem, 
which presents significant challenges for obtaining unbiased parameter estimations. 
According to Neyman and Scott (1948), who first raised the issue of incidental 
parameters, the inconsistency of incidental parameters (fixed effects) arises because the 
number of incidental parameters N increases without bounds while the amount of 
information about each parameter is fixed. Hence, estimating a nonlinear model 
(especially an unconditional fixed-effects logit model) in large but narrow panels (with T 
fixed and N, the number of groups, growing infinitely) using the maximum likelihood 
method leads to severe bias (inconsistency) in the fixed effects and in the coefficients of 
the other control variables. This bias in the parameters is of the order of 1/T for balanced 
panels (Greene, 2011) and thus disappears as T becomes large. However, it is unclear 
which exact order of T produces unbiased estimates. Katz (2001) judges the performances 
of unconditional and conditional maximum likelihood estimators in fixed-effects logit 
models based on finite-sample properties where N units have been observed for T time 
periods. He shows evidence through a series of Monte Carlo experiments that for the time 
periods T ≥ 16, unconditional and conditional maximum likelihood lead to the same 
                                                 
21
 Note, however, that unconditional fixed-effects probit models are biased. In addition, the 
conditional fixed-effects model is not suitable in our case because only countries that display 
some heterogeneity in the outcome variable are taken into account in estimating the model. The 
requirement is binding in this setup given the small size of the cross-section dimension of our 
panel and the fact that for certain countries, the dependent variable takes either 1 or 0. 

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results. Further, Greene (2011, p. 621) illustrates in Monte Carlo simulations using a 
sample of N = 1000 with 200 replications that the bias of parameters is only about 6.9% 
when T = 20, but as large as 100% if T = 2. In this paper, our nonlinear model is 
estimated by relying on the unconditional fixed-effects logit model and, given the above 
discussion, the incidental parameter is not a problem in our case, as the temporal 
dimension of our panel is T= 29 years. 
4 Third, a concern when dealing with binary time-series cross-section models is how to 
model the temporal dependence (Beck et al., 1998), since in such situations, ordinary logit or 
probit models may result in too many inferences (too high t-statistics). The empirical 
literature offers several approaches to deal with the temporal dependence issue in such 
models: temporal dummy variables for each episode or ‘spell’ or specific transformations of 
time (duration variable) as covariates in the model (for e.g., a ‘linear’ time variable). Beck et 
al. (1998) show evidence that panel logit data are identical to grouped duration data and 
suggest dealing with this problem by adding a series of dummy variables to the model. These 
dummies should capture the number of years since the previous occurrence of an ‘event’. 
However, according to them, this solution has the drawback that it leads to an important loss 
of degrees of freedom (owing to the large number of dummy variables) and makes the hazard 
rate function likely to zig zag over time. Consequently, Beck et al. (1998) propose replacing 
the dummy variables with a smooth function based on ‘natural cubic splines’. This vector of 
spline-based variables, which are cubic polynomials of the time (t), smooth out the 
coefficients and the hazard function based on them. Hence, the number of spline variables 
will be lower than the number of time dummies; further, the statistical significance will be 
easier to achieve and the time dependence of the hazard function straightforward to test (see 
also the application of this technique in the recent paper by Castro and Martins, 2012). In this 
paper, we model the temporal dependence by using the ‘natural cubic splines’ as proposed by 
Beck et al. (1998). Moreover, we also follow another of Beck et al.’s (1998) suggestions by 
adding a variable that picks up the number of past events (e.g., the number of past episodes of 
non-excessive debt in our case). The inclusion of such a variable is justified by the fact that 
standard logit models assume ‘excessive debt’ states to be independent of one another, an 
argument which is obviously not true. 
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7. Empirical results 
This section presents the results obtained from the statistical analysis (Table 1) and those 
obtained from the estimations of the different model specifications discussed above (Tables 2 
to 5). Note that we standardise all our continuous covariates to allow meaningful economic 
interpretations. 
Before presenting these results, we first highlight one shortcoming of this study. Although it 
is possible to estimate the different specifications of the model for the panel of WAEMU 
countries, such estimations are not possible for ECCAS sub-sample of countries either by the 
use of the logit model (the results do not converge) or by the use of the trimmed sample for 
the LPM (because in trimming the data, we are left with few observations, which prohibits 
statistical inferences). This shortcoming of the cross-sectional dimension of our panel 
prevents us from performing a graphical analysis of the interaction terms (as recommended by 
Greene, 2010). Further, this is especially the case when our variables of interest (EVI and its 
square/or EVI components and their squares) are interacted with the dummyWAEMU to 
measure how the partial effect of EVI – and its square/or EVI components and their squares – 
on the probability of excessive debt varies with a switch from WAEMU to ECCAS. 
Table 1 shows the results obtained from performing a fractional polynomial analysis (FPA) to 
find out the correct parametric form for our variable of interest (the ‘EVI’ predictor), namely 
to check the linearity of that variable with the logit model (e.g., Hosmer and Lemeshow, 
1999, 2000). The FPA consists of choosing between competing models by performing an 
Analysis of Deviance22 where the deviance statistics of these models are compared. The 
difference in the deviance between the two models is the likelihood ratio, G2, which has a null 
Chi-Squared distribution (Agresti, 2002). The FPA’s results suggest that the minimum 
deviance statistic (i.e., 123.21) is observed for model M2. In other words, model M2 is the 
best fitting nonlinear transformation that contains the ‘EVI’ and ‘EVI square’ variables. In 
fact, when comparing model M2 (the nonlinear model) with the linear model M1, we find 
evidence that the likelihood ratio test statistic, G2 (i.e., the deviance for model M1 minus that 
for M2), is 7.638, with a significance level as follows: p-value = 0057.0)638.7)1(Pr( 2 =≥χ . 
Since this p-value is lower than 0.01, we conclude that model M2 is significantly different 
from model M1 and therefore retains the nonlinear specification that contains the ‘EVI’ and 
‘EVI square’ variables. 
                                                 
22
 Note that the Analysis of Deviance is like the ANOVA used in multivariate normal regressions. 

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The inclusion of EVI’s components in the analysis (see Tables 3, 5 and 6) allows us to 
explore whether the effects of ‘EVI’ on the chance of CFA Franc Zone countries entering into 
excessive debt are driven mainly by the variables ‘exposure’ and/or ‘shock’. Nevertheless, we 
recognise that the effects of shocks on the probability of the excessive debt of a given country 
pertaining to this Zone could depend on the exposure of this country to shocks. To take into 
account (at least partially) the interaction between ‘exposure’ and ‘shock’, we include in the 
specification the variable ‘exposureshock’, which is the result of multiplying the ‘exposure’ 
and ‘shock’ variables (see the details in Appendix A). 
Tables 2 to 5 have the same structures. We report in Columns [1], [2], [3] and [4] the results 
associated respectively to the unconditional fixed-effects logit model, the average partial 
effects regarding the latter, the results obtained from the LPM based on the whole sample and 
the results obtained from the LPM based on the trimmed sample (following the SLS 
procedure). Irrespective of the table considered (Tables 2 to 4), we find evidence that the 
results (sign, significance and magnitude of coefficients) of the LPM based on the whole 
sample are similar to the average partial effects of the unconditional logit specification, 
whereas the results of the LPM based on the SLS procedure are not23. In addition, the 
magnitudes of the coefficients of the two LPMs are unexplainable differences.  
Table 2 presents the results of the model specification comprising both the variables ‘EVI’ 
and its square. Following Greene (2010), we performed a simple Wald test of the zero 
interaction effect24 for the coefficient of ‘EVI’ and that of ‘EVI square’ (see the Appendix D 
for the derivations of the logit model to obtain the interaction term, especially when applied to 
the simple case of a model specification where we have both a continuous variable and its 
square). As this test is sufficient but not necessary (Greene, 2010), it provides us with a good 
insight into the statistical significance of the ‘EVI square’ coefficient. 
The result of this test shows that the interaction term (the coefficient of ‘EVI’ square) is 
statistically significant ( 2 (2) 7.76χ =  with a p-value = 0.0206). Despite the divergence of the 
results between the LPM based on the whole sample and that based on the SLS procedure 
(Columns [3] and [4]), we obtain evidence that EVI is associated with nonlinearity with 
                                                 
23
 However, the sign and significance of certain estimates in the LPM based on the SLS procedure 
are identical to those of the logit model.  
24
 As mentioned above, according to Ai and Norton (2003), the interaction effect is based on 
cross-partial derivatives with respect to the two interacted variables, which makes the sign and 
significance of the interaction term different for these observations. 

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respect to the likelihood of excessive debt in CFA Franc Zone countries. We can conclude 
that irrespective of the potential control variables, ‘EVI’ displays an inverted U-shaped curve 
relationship with the probability of entering into excessive debt in the CFA Franc Zone: an 
increase in one standard deviation of ‘EVI’ leads to a higher probability of excessive debt in 
this Zone; for higher levels of ‘EVI’, this probability decreases. The top point (turning point) 
of the ‘standardised EVI’ is approximately 0.50 for the LPM based on the whole sample and 
0.4749 for the LPM based on the trimmed sample. As can be observed from these results, the 
turning points are almost the same. These results can be interpreted as follows: when the 
‘EVI’ of these countries increases over time, they draw on their non-costly financial resources 
(see the details above) to cope with the additional financing needs induced by such a rise in 
structural vulnerability. However, after a certain level of ‘EVI’, these countries have no 
choice but to resort to either domestic or external debt, thereby increasing their likelihood of 
indebtedness. Hypothesis 2 thus seems to be valid here. Consequently, the same reasoning 
will be applied in cases where we observe a negative effect of ‘EVI square’ and a positive 
effect of ‘EVI’.  
In terms of the control variables, as shown by the Joint F-test on the duration dependence 
variables (Column [1]), there is a negative duration dependence in the behaviour of CFA 
Franc Zone countries compared with their likelihood of entering into excessive debt. In 
addition, the ‘Convergence, Stability, Growth and Solidarity Pact’ has lowered the likelihood 
of these countries entering into excessive debt compared with the period where such 
budgetary discipline does not exist (1980–1998). The probability of excessive debt is also 
positively driven by a rise in the grants, a rise in inflation, a depreciation in the real exchange 
rate and a deterioration in terms of trade. Real GDP growth and the fiscal balance seem to 
exert no statistical effect on the probability of excessive debt in CFA Franc Zone countries. 
Table 3 contains the results of the model specification where ‘EVI’ and its square are replaced 
by EVI’s components as well as their squares. The average partial effects (Column [2]) of the 
control covariates are roughly the same as those of Table 1 (Column [2]), except that here, the 
fiscal balance variable is positively associated with the probability of excessive debt in CFA 
Franc Zone countries. In other words, an improvement in the fiscal balance leads these 
countries to enter into excessive debt. 
Concerning our variable of interest (‘EVI’s components and their squares), the results of the 
LPM based on the full sample are suggestive of a statistically significance (at the 1% level) of 
the variables ‘shock’, ‘shock square’ and ‘exposure*shock’. The results of the LPM based on 
the SLS procedure suggest, however, that among our variables of interest, only ‘shock square’ 
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and ‘exposure square’ are statistically significant, although at the 10% significance level for 
the latter. Overall, we conclude from Table 3’s results that the nonlinearity observed for EVI 
with respect to the probability of excessive debt in CFA Franc Zone countries seems to be 
driven to a certain extent by both the ‘exposure’ and the ‘shock’ components of the ‘EVI’ 
variable. 
Table 4 discriminates between the impact of EVI on the probability of excessive debt in 
WAEMU versus ECCAS. Once again, the average partial effects associated with the control 
explanatory variables and shown in Column [2] display roughly the same sign, magnitude and 
significance as those in Table 2. In addition, we observe as in Table 3 that an improvement in 
the fiscal balance increases the chance of CFA Franc Zone countries entering into excessive 
debt: a one standard deviation rise in the fiscal balance (i.e., 9.25%) increases the probability 
of excessive debt by 7.4% (although the statistical significance is only 10%). Moreover, 
irrespective of the model specification considered (logistic, linear probability based on the full 
sample or on the trimmed sample), WAEMU countries have a greater chance of entering into 
excessive debt than ECCAS countries. The result in Column [2] shows that holding all other 
covariates fixed, WAEMU countries have a 51.52% higher probability of entering into 
excessive debt compared with their ECCAS counterparts. Despite this difference in terms of 
behaviour, the inverted U-shaped relationship previously observed for EVI with respect to the 
probability of excessive indebtedness seems to be the same in terms of magnitude for 
WAEMU and ECCAS. 
In Table 5, we use the model specification for which the results are displayed in Table 4 but 
replace the ‘EVI’ variable and its square by its components and their squares in addition to the 
interaction between the components. The average partial effects obtained for the control 
covariates are roughly the same as those reported in Table 4, except for the variable 
‘dummyWAEMU’, where the average partial effect is higher than that in Table 4, and for the 
real exchange rate variable, which is here negative and significantly related to the likelihood 
of excessive indebtedness of CFA Franc Zone countries. As stipulated above, we cannot 
interpret the interaction terms associated with our variables of interest based on the average 
partial effects reported in Column [2]. Evidence is shown from Column [3] of Table 5 that 
despite the previously observed absence of a difference between WAEMU and ECCAS 
countries in terms of the nonlinearity of EVI with respect to the probability of excessive debt, 
a simultaneous rise in both ‘exposure to shocks’ and ‘shocks’ seems to exert a higher impact 
in WAEMU than in ECCAS countries. Further, the coefficient of the variable ‘shock square’ 
interacted with the variable ‘dummyWAEMU’ is negative and significant. Since the other 
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interaction variables with the ‘dummyWAEMU’ are not statistically significant at the 10% 
level, the interpretation of such results would be based on the combination of the two previous 
results. Hence, from the results of the LPM based on the full sample, we find that a one 
standard deviation increase in ‘exposure’ and a one standard deviation rise in ‘shock’ will 
lead to a probability of excessive debt = (-1.184+1.59) = 0.406 = 40.6% higher in WAEMU 
than in ECCAS countries.  
We highlighted above the first shortcoming of our study. Another shortcoming is the 
difficulties in using a political/institutional variable. In fact, we intend to see whether the 
quality of governance in these countries alleviates or even renders statistically nil the effect of 
‘EVI’ (and its square) on the probability of excessive debt and whether once taking into 
account this variable, the effects of our variables of interest differ between WAEMU and 
ECCAS countries. 
For this reason, we need to introduce the variable ‘quality of governance’ into the model. 
However, since the data on this variable are not available for many countries of our sample 
and given the small size of the latter, we cannot use either the logistic model or the LPM 
based on the trimmed sample to perform this analysis. Accordingly, to have an idea of such 
effect, we rely solely on the LPM based on the full sample (the data available are also not 
sufficient to apply the SLS procedure), the results of which are presented in Table 6. The idea 
underlying the introduction of an institutional variable in the analysis is that the better the 
quality of institutions, the lower the build-up of public debt and thus the lower the likelihood 
of entering into excessive indebtedness. In addition, there is a need for developing countries 
that are structurally vulnerable to set up adequate institutions to promote competitiveness, 
build economic resilience and promote sustainable development (Farrugia, 2007). Thus, 
institutions in developing countries, particularly in CFA Franc Zone countries, should be as 
strong as possible to reflect the governance aspects inside their economic environments. 
By assuming that the variable ‘quality of governance’ really captures the quality of 
governance in these countries, the results in Table 6 show that although this variable appears 
with the expected sign, it is not statistically significant. Moreover, it does not affect the 
nonlinearity relationship between EVI and the probability of excessive debt in CFA Franc 
Zone countries. The magnitude associated with this nonlinear relationship is the same for 
WAEMU and ECCAS countries, even if the probability of excessive debt itself is higher in 
WAEMU countries than it is in ECCAS countries. The results obtained for the EVI’s 
components and their squares, as well as their interactions with the ‘dummyWAEMU’ 
variable, are consistent with the estimates in Table 5. With regard to the other control 
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variables, the likelihood of CFA Franc Zone countries entering into excessive debt seems to 
be driven positively by a depreciation in the real exchange rate or deterioration in terms of 
trade. The ‘Convergence, Stability, Growth and Solidarity Pact’ has exerted a negative impact 
on this probability, while the duration dependence remains negative and significant. The 
remaining control variables do not seem to be statistically significant. We conclude that if the 
variable ‘quality of governance’ really captures the quality of governance in CFA Franc Zone 
countries, an improvement in such quality in these countries does not affect the relationship 
observed between EVI and the probability of these countries entering into excessive 
indebtedness. 
  
8. Conclusion and policy implications  
 
By using the ‘debt rule’ among other criteria implemented by both WAEMU and ECCAS 
countries within the CFA Franc Zone for macroeconomic stability and convergence purposes, 
this paper assesses whether the structural vulnerability of such countries affects their 
indebtedness, and more particularly their likelihood of entering into excessive debt. To 
perform our analysis, we use the (structural) EVI jointly computed by Guillaumont et al. 
(2011) and the UN-DESA (United Nations –Department of Economic and Social Affairs) and 
focus on a panel of 14 CFA Franc Zone countries over the period 1980–2008. We also replace 
in the model specifications the ‘EVI’ variable with its components. Overall, the results are 
suggestive of a nonlinear effect of ‘EVI’ with respect to the probability of entering into 
excessive debt: for a rise in EVI, the probability of excessive debt increases in CFA Franc 
Zone countries; however, for higher EVI, this probability significantly declines. 
The policy implications of these results is that international development institutions such as 
the World Bank and IMF should take into account such vulnerability in their assessment of 
the adequate development policies and recommendations - especially those related to debt 
issues -, to these countries. 
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Appendix, tables and Graphs 
 
Table 1: Fractional Polynomial Analysis 
Model Hypothesis to 
be tested 
df Deviance G2 P-Value 
M0: The variable ‘EVI’ is not included in the model  0 131.56482   
M1: The variable ‘EVI’ is included in the model 
(Linear Model with respect to ‘EVI’) M0 nested in M1 1 130.85196 0.712856 0.3985 
M2: ‘EVI’ and its square are included in the model 
(Nonlinear Model with respect to ‘EVI’) M1 nested in M2 1 123.21382 7.638146 0.0057 
Note: df = Degree of Freedom; G2 = Likelihood Ratio associated to the difference of Deviances; P-Value = Probability 
associated to G2.  
 
Table 2: EVI’s Effect on the probability of Excessive Debt in CFA Franc Zone Countries 
 Dependent Variable : Excessive Debt Dummy 
Explanatory Variables Logit Model (Fixed Effects) 
Average marginal 
effect (partial 
effects)a 
Linear Probability 
Model on the whole 
sample 
Linear Probability Model 
on the trimmed sampleb 
(SLS procedure) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Evi 17.80*** 1.037467*** 1.149*** 3.702*** 
 (6.444) (.3544797) (0.370) (1.231) 
Evisq -18.46*** -1.076052*** -1.150*** -3.897*** 
 (6.890) (.3793959) (0.397) (1.265) 
Fiscal_balancet-1 1.024 .0596867 0.0255 0.204 
 (0.703) (.0405361) (0.0340) (0.157) 
Gdpgrowtht-1 -0.328 -.019126 -0.0360* -0.0232 
 (0.341) (.0196781) (0.0214) (0.0694) 
Inflationt-1 -0.770* -.044911* -0.0410 -0.135 
 (0.416) (.0238273) (0.0265) (0.0938) 
Grantsgdpt-1 1.802*** .1050366*** 0.0573 0.796*** 
 (0.564) (.0304828) (0.0385) (0.276) 
REERt-1 -0.767* -.0447252* -0.121*** -0.143 
 (0.447) (.0255027) (0.0308) (0.0925) 
Termstrade -3.058*** -.1782468*** -0.126*** -0.501*** 
 (0.742) (.0392632) (0.0295) (0.167) 
Pacte -3.229*** -.1882356*** -0.143*** -0.444** 
 (1.022) (.0561457) (0.0479) (0.203) 
Number -2.308*** -.1345159*** -0.217*** -0.488*** 
 (0.557) (.0276998) (0.0402) (0.118) 
Variable -1.095*** -.0638374*** -0.0657*** -0.139* 
 (0.228) (.0107247) (0.0123) (0.0743) 
Spline (1) -0.00107 -.0000624 -0.000317** 0.000443 
 (0.00119) (.0000687) (0.000147) (0.00157) 
Spline (2) -0.000170 -9.91e-06 0.000234 0.0257** 
 (0.00233) (.0001358) (0.000160) (0.0113) 
Spline (3) -0.0122*** -.0007086*** -0.000282 -0.0192* 
 (0.00423) (.0002316) (0.000336) (0.0103) 
   
  Observations  317  344 99 
Log likelihood         -61.606908    
Wald Chi2c / F-Statistic (P-
Value) 64.44 (0.0000)  157.20 (0.0000) 8.63 (0.0000) 
R Squared   0.838 0.7546 
     
Joint F-test on « Duration 
dependence » variables 23.27 (0.0001)  8.40 (0.0000) 5.18 (0.0010) 
Fixed Effects 
Significance 51.41 (0.0000)  141.24 (0.0000) 12.95 (0.0000) 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. All these models contain country-dummies fixed effects. Standard 
Errors are in parenthesis. a: The average marginal effects are computed using the Delta method. b: This is the Sequential 
Least Square procedure of Horrace and Oaxaca (2006). c: The Wald test and the P-Value associated concerns the logit model 
where all coefficients are tested to be jointly equal to zero. The F-statistic and the P-value are associated to the linear 
probability models.  

	ABCDEF*A*
 
36 
 
 
Table 3: EVI’s components Effect on the probability of Excessive Debt in CFA Franc Zone 
Countries 
 
Dependent Variable : Excessive Debt Dummy 
Explanatory Variables 
Logit Model 
(Fixed Effects) 
Average marginal 
effect (partial 
effects)a 
Linear Probability 
Model on the whole 
sample 
Linear Probability Model on the 
trimmed sampleb (SLS 
procedure) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exposure -9.258 -.4834815 -0.357 -2.849 
 (9.356) (.486234) (0.467) (1.827) 
Shock 12.79 .6676987* 1.220*** 1.881 
 (7.775) (.396062) (0.332) (1.466) 
Exposuresq 16.83* .878965* 0.837 3.900* 
 (9.780) (.5013442) (0.518) (2.082) 
Shocksq -9.284*** -.4848228*** -0.460*** -2.064*** 
 (3.060) (.147198) (0.177) (0.579) 
Exposureshock -4.495 -.2347203 -1.005*** -0.0285 
 (9.033) (.4702039) (0.335) (1.596) 
Fiscal_balancet-1 1.977** .1032258*** 0.0437 0.635*** 
 (0.873) (.0440164) (0.0341) (0.196) 
Gdpgrowtht-1 -0.297 -.0154988 -0.0342 -0.0470 
 (0.381) (.0197703) (0.0212) (0.0806) 
Inflationt-1 -0.896* -.0467909* -0.0404 -0.174 
 (0.480) (.0244584) (0.0250) (0.121) 
Grantsgdpt-1 1.913*** .0998922*** 0.0371 1.074*** 
 (0.619) (.0301187) (0.0374) (0.275) 
REERt-1 -0.893* -.0466562** -0.131*** -0.132 
 (0.463) (.0232502) (0.0323) (0.0828) 
Termstrade -3.205*** -.1673953*** -0.122*** -0.461*** 
 (0.814) (.0377766) (0.0297) (0.154) 
Pacte -2.965*** -.1548515 -0.162*** -0.477** 
 (1.051) (.051094) (0.0539) (0.180) 
Number -3.180*** -.1660735*** -0.227*** -0.847*** 
 (0.724) (.0310941) (0.0409) (0.147) 
Variable -1.263*** -.0659435*** -0.0652*** -0.153** 
 (0.261) (.0109898) (0.0121) (0.0754) 
Spline (1) -0.00161 -.000084 -0.000336** 0.000845 
 (0.00125) (.0000646) (0.000151) (0.00349) 
Spline (2) 0.000521 .0000272 0.000293* 0.0320*** 
 (0.00281) (.0001465) (0.000165) (0.0109) 
Spline (3) -0.0152*** -.0007923*** -0.000345 -0.0245* 
 (0.00489) (.0002358) (0.000351) (0.0130) 
 
    
Observations  317  344 83 
Log likelihood         -55.237813    
Wald Chi2c / F-Statistic 
(P-Value) 58.24 (0.0010)  146.62 (0.0000) 6.75 (0.0000) 
R Squared   0.840 0.784 
  
 
  
Joint F-test on « Duration 
dependence » variables 23.46 (0.0001)  8.63 (0.0000) 6.66 (0.0002) 
Fixed Effects Significance 38.82 (0.0001)  127.51 (0.0000) 9.38 (0.0000) 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. All these models contain country-dummies fixed effects. Standard 
Errors are in parenthesis. a: The average marginal effects are computed using the Delta method. b: This is the Sequential 
Least Square procedure of Horrace and Oaxaca (2006). c: The Wald test and the P-Value associated concerns the logit model 
where all coefficients are tested to be jointly equal to zero. The F-statistic and the P-value are associated to the linear 
probability models.  
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Table 4: ‘EVI’s Effect on the probability of Excessive Debt in WAEMU versus ECCAS  
 
Dependent Variable : Excessive Debt Dummy 
Explanatory Variables 
Logit Model 
(Fixed 
Effects) 
Average marginal 
effect (partial 
effects)a 
Linear Probability Model 
on the whole sample 
Linear Probability Model 
on the trimmed sampleb 
(SLS procedure) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Evi 1.737 .0985157 0.289 0.574 
 (12.73) (.7219109) (0.495) (1.888) 
Evisq -1.007 -.0571219 -0.255 -0.516 
 (14.75) (.8364606) (0.484) (2.091) 
dummyWAEMU 3.631*** .2059909*** 0.890*** 2.753*** 
 (1.202) (.0622984) (0.162) (0.452) 
Eviwaemu 22.56 1.279856 2.279*** 3.971* 
 (14.56) (.8120269) (0.810) (2.183) 
Evisqwaemu -24.28 -1.377162 -2.470*** -4.232* 
 (16.88) (.9428261) (0.858) (2.437) 
Fiscal_balancet-1 1.307* .0741478* 0.0649** 0.218 
 (0.790) (.0441364) (0.0327) (0.196) 
Gdpgrowtht-1 -0.196 -.0111365 -0.0386* -0.0734 
 (0.372) (.0210011) (0.0215) (0.0732) 
Inflationt-1 -0.718* -.0407349* -0.0374 -0.0792 
 (0.431) (.0240257) (0.0266) (0.0821) 
Grantsgdpt-1 1.735*** .0984442*** 0.0496 0.309* 
 (0.575) (.030467) (0.0377) (0.162) 
REERt-1 -0.733 -.0416072 -0.118*** -0.100 
 (0.464) (.02585) (0.0297) (0.0980) 
Termstrade -3.089*** -.1752252*** -0.146*** -0.455*** 
 (0.781) (.0405236) (0.0281) (0.170) 
Pacte -3.137*** -.1779594*** -0.110** -0.533** 
 (1.040) (.0557497) (0.0488) (0.243) 
Number -2.448*** -.1388575*** -0.259*** -0.411*** 
 (0.594) (.028832) (0.0399) (0.112) 
Variable -1.086*** -.0615867*** -0.0652*** -0.190*** 
 (0.228) (.0105242) (0.0120) (0.0514) 
Spline (1) -0.00104 -.0000593 -0.000336** -1.29e-05 
 (0.00124) (.0000703) (0.000150) (0.000204) 
Spline (2) -0.000590 -.0000335 0.000182 -0.000298 
 (0.00248) (.0001404) (0.000165) (0.00100) 
Spline (3) -0.0112*** -.0006339*** -0.000164 -0.00221* 
 (0.00432) (.0002327) (0.000337) (0.00128) 
 
 
   
Observations  317  344 111 
Log likelihood         -60.179742    
Wald Chi2c / F-Statistic (P-
Value) 64.22 (0.0001)  157.14 (0.0000) 8.82 (0.0000) 
R Squared   0.843 0.749 
Joint F-test on « Duration 
dependence » variables 
22.86 
(0.0001)  8.50 (0.0000) 3.71 (0.0079) 
Fixed Effects Significance 31.64 (0.0009)  132.71 (0.0000) 10.75 (0.0000) 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. All these models contain country-dummies fixed effects. Standard 
Errors are in parenthesis. a: The average marginal effects are computed using the Delta method. b: This is the Sequential 
Least Square procedure of Horrace and Oaxaca (2006). c: The Wald test and the P-Value associated concerns the logit model 
where all coefficients are tested to be jointly equal to zero. The F-statistic and the P-value are associated to the linear 
probability models.  
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Table 5: ‘EVI’s components Effect on the probability of Excessive Debt in WAEMU versus 
ECCAS  
 
Dependent Variable : Excessive Debt Dummy 
Explanatory Variables 
Logit Model 
(Fixed 
Effects) 
Average 
marginal effect 
(partial effects)a 
Linear Probability Model 
on the whole sample 
Linear Probability Model on 
the trimmed sampleb (SLS 
procedure) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exposure -17.26 -.8111736 -1.656** -4.004 
 (18.12) (.8479976) (0.671) (2.887) 
Shock 18.51 .8698677 1.176*** 5.433* 
 (13.15) (.6040299) (0.370) (3.079) 
dummyWAEMU 10.96*** .5151719*** 1.523*** 2.349*** 
 (2.796) (.1117504) (0.189) (0.764) 
Exposuresq 27.86 1.309631 1.944*** 7.009** 
 (17.70) (.8181585) (0.641) (3.240) 
Shocksq 2.916 .1370845 -0.0337 0.851 
 (5.787) (.2716366) (0.160) (0.983) 
Exposureshock -27.43* -1.28945* -1.522*** -8.453** 
 (15.27) (.6934194) (0.341) (3.767) 
Exposurewaemu -2.192 -.1030191 0.964 0.825 
 (22.34) (1.050018) (1.114) (3.947) 
Shockwaemu -4.572 -.2148894 0.0277 -3.176 
 (15.96) (.7488446) (0.690) (3.933) 
Exposuresqwaemu 1.554 .0730482 -0.892 -1.754 
 (23.00) (1.080952) (1.276) (4.270) 
Shocksqwaemu -14.99** -.7046872** -1.184*** -3.134** 
 (6.886) (.3102294) (0.301) (1.320) 
Exposureshockwaemu 27.45 1.290239 1.588* 8.937* 
 (18.62) (.8557206) (0.904) (4.959) 
Fiscal_balancet-1 2.094** .0984357** 0.0556* 0.527* 
 (0.987) (.0450082) (0.0320) (0.287) 
Gdpgrowtht-1 -0.239 -.0112262 -0.0436** -0.0309 
 (0.452) (.0211115) (0.0178) (0.137) 
Inflationt-1 -1.034** -.0486139** -0.0407* -0.201 
 (0.519) (.0234128) (0.0239) (0.135) 
Grantsgdpt-1 1.951*** .0917232*** 0.0553 0.503** 
 (0.633) (.0272569) (0.0382) (0.212) 
REERt-1 -1.464** -.0688191** -0.119*** -0.325* 
 (0.631) (.0284533) (0.0284) (0.179) 
Termstrade -3.165*** -.1487908*** -0.169*** -0.661** 
 (0.947) (.0411214) (0.0293) (0.306) 
Pacte -2.821** -.1326018*** -0.144*** -0.493* 
 (1.121) (.0499856) (0.0513) (0.273) 
Number -3.316*** -.1558461*** -0.302*** -0.713*** 
 (0.723) (.0260734) (0.0412) (0.178) 
Variable -1.334*** -.0626965*** -0.0648*** -0.347*** 
 (0.291) (.0110908) (0.0117) (0.113) 
Spline (1) -0.00190 -.0000892 -0.000279* -0.000273 
 (0.00153) (.000071) (0.000144) (0.000248) 
Spline (2) 0.00242 .0001136 0.000285* 0.00149** 
 (0.00423) (.0001987) (0.000163) (0.000734) 
Spline (3) -0.0172*** -.000807*** -0.000408 -0.00565*** 
 (0.00620) (.0002734) (0.000334) (0.00193) 
     
Observations  317  344 80 
Log likelihood         -49.682483    
Wald Chi2c / F-Statistic (P-Value) 53.34 (0.0185)  136.23 (0.0000) 5.07 (0.0001) 
R Squared   0.860 0.737 
Joint F-test on « Duration 
dependence » variables 
21.34 
(0.0003)  8.92 (0.0000) 3.30 (0.0183) 
Fixed Effects Significance 23.72  45.32 (0.0000) 9.38 (0.0000) 
Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. All these models contain country-dummies fixed effects. Standard 
Errors are in parenthesis. a: The average marginal effects are computed using the Delta method. b: This is the Sequential 
Least Square procedure of Horrace and Oaxaca (2006). c: The Wald test and the P-Value associated concerns the logit model 
where all coefficients are tested to be jointly equal to zero. The F-statistic and the P-value are associated to the linear 
probability models.  
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Table 6: ‘EVI’s components Effect on the probability of Excessive Debt in WAEMU versus 
ECCAS: Taking in account the ‘Quality of Governance’  
 
Dependent Variable : Excessive Debt Dummy 
Explanatory Variables Linear Probability Model on the 
whole sample 
Linear Probability Model on the whole 
sample 
 (1) (2) 
Evi 2.035**  
 (0.888)  
Evisq -2.059*  
 (1.075)  
Eviwaemu -1.020  
 (1.169)  
Evisqwaemu 1.194  
 (1.382)  
Exposure  0.0379 
  (1.032) 
Shock  1.367* 
  (0.707) 
dummyWAEMU 0.739*** 1.728*** 
 (0.133) (0.274) 
Exposuresq  0.965 
  (1.172) 
Shocksq  1.794** 
  (0.887) 
Exposureshock  -2.929*** 
  (1.072) 
Exposurewaemu  -0.538 
  (1.390) 
Shockwaemu  -0.669 
  (0.853) 
Exposuresqwaemu  -0.392 
  (1.592) 
Shocksqwaemu  -2.968*** 
  (0.999) 
Exposureshockwaemu  3.717*** 
  (1.205) 
Qog -0.143 -0.350 
 (0.243) (0.284) 
Fiscal_balancet-1 -0.0238 -0.0157 
 (0.0417) (0.0374) 
Gdpgrowtht-1 -0.0234 -0.0318 
 (0.0300) (0.0277) 
Inflationt-1 -0.00488 -0.00169 
 (0.0261) (0.0256) 
Grantsgdpt-1 0.0133 0.0143 
 (0.0283) (0.0250) 
REERt-1 -0.117*** -0.108** 
 (0.0387) (0.0452) 
Termstrade -0.147*** -0.138*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0354) 
Pacte -0.100* -0.189*** 
 (0.0600) (0.0659) 
Number -0.374*** -0.335*** 
 (0.0532) (0.0574) 
Variable -0.102*** -0.102*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0236) 
Spline (1) -0.000519*** -0.000435** 
 (0.000175) (0.000213) 
Spline (2) 0.000251* 0.000268 
 (0.000135) (0.000164) 
Spline (3) -0.000148 -0.000316 
 (0.000260) (0.000331) 
   
Observations  218 218 
F-statistic (Pvalue) 291.48 (0.0000) 246.25 (0.0000) 
R Squared 0.921 0.931 
Joint F-test on « Duration dependence » 11.94 (0.0000) 14.53 (0.0000) 
Fixed Effects Significance 9.72 (0.0000) 12.79 (0.0000) 
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Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. All these models contain country-dummies fixed effects. Standard 
Errors are in parenthesis. a: The average marginal effects are computed using the Delta method. b: This is the Sequential 
Least Square procedure of Horrace and Oaxaca (2006). c: The Wald test and the P-Value associated concerns the logit model 
where all coefficients are tested to be jointly equal to zero. The F-statistic and the P-value are associated to the linear 
probability models.  
 
Appendix A: Definition and Source of variables 
Variable and Definition Source and Comments 
Dummyexcessivedebt 
The author ‘s computation is based on the IMF’s database on Gross Public Debt – 
The IMF’s database weblink on Gross Public debt is: 
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=262. 
This dummy variable takes the value ‘1’ if the total Gross Public Debt-to-GDP ratio 
is higher than 70% and the value‘0’, otherwise. 
EVI = Economic Vulnerability 
Index Guillaumont and Cariolle, J. (2011). 
Exposure = Exposure Index We use the ‘exposure index’ provided by Guillaumont and Cariolle, J. (2011) that 
we divide by 2, as the ‘EVI’ is the average of Exposure Index and Shock Index. 
Shock = Shock Index We use the ‘exposure index’ provided by Guillaumont and Cariolle, J. (2011) that 
we divide by 2, as the ‘EVI’ is the average of Exposure Index and Shock Index. 
Fiscal_balance = Fiscal Balance 
in percentage of GDP 
Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Developpement International (CERDI)’s 
Public Finance Database. Fiscal balance is the overall revenue (tax and non-tax 
revenue), excluding grants minus government expenditures. 
Gdpgrowth = Real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth (annual %) 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 2011 
 
Termstrade = Net barter terms 
of trade index (2000 = 100) 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 2011 
 
REER = Real Effective 
Exchange Rate, Base 100 = 
2000 
CERDI’s Database: This is the Real Effective Exchange Rate, base 2005 = 100 
computed by CERDI: it is the ratio of prices in the country to prices in the main 
import partners adjusted for variations in nominal effective exchange rate. An 
increase means an appreciation. 
Grantsgdp = Grants in percent 
of GDP. 
 
Grants data are grants disbursements by all donors expressed in current millions of 
US Dollars. They are extracted from the OECD Statistical Database. The GDP used 
to calculate the ratio of Grants in percentage of GDP is extracted from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) 2011. 
 Inflation = Inflation, GDP 
deflator (annual %) 
World Development Indicators (WDI) 2011 
 
DummyWAEMU This an indicator variable taking the value ‘1’ if the country of CFA Franc Zone is WAEMU’s member, and ‘0’, otherwise. 
Number This variable indicates the number of prior excessive debt episodes (or spells)  
Pacte 
This is a dummy variable capturing the entry into force of the ‘Stability, Growth and 
Solidarity Pact’ within the zone franc since 1999. It takes the value ‘1’ for the years 
1999-2008, and ‘0’, otherwise. 
Quality of Governance 
The quality of governance is measured by subjective indices from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The quality-of-governance index from ICRG used here 
is an 18-point scale, created by summing the following three six-point scales: 
corruption in government, bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law. See the ICRG 
for the criteria used in coding these measures. The rationale for corruption and 
bureaucratic quality is obvious. The rule-of-law definition indicates that this 
measure reflects the government's administrative capacity in enforcing the law, as 
well as the potential for rent-seeking associated with weak legal systems and 
insecure property rights. Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data. 
Other Variables 
Evisq = The square of ‘EVI’; Exposuresq = the square of ‘Exposure’; Shocksq = the square of ‘shock’; Exposureshock 
= Exposure*Shock; Eviwaemu = Evi*DummyWAEMU; Evisqwaemu  = Evisq*DummyWAEMU; Exposuresqwaemu 
= Exposuresq*DummyWAEMU; Shocksqwaemu = Shocksq*DummyWAEMU; Exposureshockwaemu = 
Exposureshock*DummyWAEMU. 
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Appendix B: Statistics on Periods of ‘Excessive debt’ on CFA Franc Zone countries 
Country Period of the data on Total 
Public Debt availability 
Period of ‘Excessive debt’ 
Benin 1980-2008 1983; 1985; 1989-1991; 1993-1995 
Burkina Faso 1980-2008 ‘No identified period of ‘excessive debt’ 
Cameroon 1980-2008 1994-2003 
Central African Rep. 1980-2008 1994-2008 
Chad 1980-2008 1994; 1999-2000 
Congo, Republic of 1980-2008 1981-2007 
Côte d’Ivoire 1980-2008 1982-2008 
Equatorial Guinea 1985-2008 1985-1996 
Gabon 1980-2008 1987-1989; 1994-2003 
Guinea-Bissau 1986-2008 1986-2008 
Mali 1980-2008 1982-2001 
Niger 1980-2008 1994-2002 
Senegal 1980-2008 1983-1988; 1994-1999; 2001 
Togo 1980-2008 1980-1989; 1991; 1993-2007 
 
Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Dummyexcessivedebt 393 0.524173 0.5000519 0 1 
Evi 401 43.22752 9.917783 24.67814 72.40889 
Exposure 406 26.19997 5.148306 16.6997 40.30086 
Shock 401 17.0898 6.899618 5.937748 37.36527 
Fiscal_balance 375 4.34111 9.248568 -17.94905 38.85204 
Gdpgrowth 400 3.705248 7.968115 -28.09998 71.18799 
Inflation 400 7.950738 15.72924 -29.17266 112.8948 
Grantsgdp 401 9.980065 9.037769 0.193719 49.40295 
REER 406 126.1705 34.87212 40.2845 259.0221 
Termstrade 401 123.2465 55.78856 21.27743 357.5757 
Pacte 406 0.2413793 0.4284478 0 1 
Qog 245 0.3803713 0.1215567 0.1666667 0.6944445 
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Appendix D: Interaction Effects 
 
We provide here a general derivation of interaction effects in both linear and non-linear 
models, following Ai and Norton (2003) and Ai, Norton and Wang (2004). In fact, these 
authors demonstrate on the basis of a model comprising two interacted variables that the 
interaction effect is based on cross-partial derivatives with respect to the two interacted 
variables, which makes the sign and significance of the interaction term different for 
observations.  
This Appendix is structured as follows:  
4 Firstly, we present a general derivation of interaction effects in linear models.  
4 Secondly, we focus on non-linear models, specifically logit model, where we consider 
interaction effects only for variables that do not have high order terms (that is for example, a 
continuous variable and its square): the demonstration is performed for two different cases: 
the first one deals with two interacted continuous variables and the second deals with two 
interacted variables where one is continuous and the other is a dummy. 
4 Thirdly, and lastly, we consider the case of non-linear (logit) model which contains 
continuous variables with high order terms. 
   
1- Interaction effects in linear models 
 
Consider the following linear specification of the expected value of dependent variable:  
1 2 1 1 2 2 12 1 2[ / , , ] TE y x x x x x x x xβ β β β= + + +                              (1) 
where 1β , 2β  and 12β are parameters and β  is a vector of parameters, all of them are 
unknown. Tx  is a vector of variables that excludes 1x and 2x  (that is, Tx is supposed to be 
independent of 1x and 2x ). 
Assuming that 1x and 2x  are continuous variables. The marginal effects of 1x  on the expected 
value 1 2[ / , , ]E E y x x x=  depends on 2x  if 12 0β ≠ : 1 12 2
1
E
x
x
β β∂ = +
∂
         (2)   
The interaction effect given by the impact of a marginal change in 2x  on the marginal effect 
of 1x , is thus obtained from taking the derivative of (2) with respect to 2x :  
2
12
2 1
E
x x
β∂ =
∂ ∂
   (3). 
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As a consequence, in linear specifications, the interaction effect 
2
2 1
E
x x
∂
∂ ∂
 equals the marginal 
effect 12
2 1( )
E E
x x w
β∂ ∂= =
∂ ∂
where w represents the interaction term. However, in non-linear 
models such as logit and probit, this inequality does not hold. In the next section, we provide 
a general derivation of interaction effects in logit model where the interaction variables are 
continuous and where ther is no high order terms in the model.  
 
2- Interaction effects in non-linear models: the case of logit model without high order 
terms 
Consider now the following expected value of dependent variable y:  
1 2 1 1 2 2 12 1 2[ / , , ] ( ) ( )TE y x x x F x x x x x F uβ β β β= + + + =             (4) 
Where F(u) is a nonlinear function of its argument 1 1 2 2 12 1 2 Tu x x x x xβ β β β= + + + .  
For example, in the logit model, F(u) is equals the cumulative distribution function defined as 
exp( )( )
1 exp( )
uF u
u
=
+
 where exp denotes the exponentiel function. For probit model, F(u) would 
be the cumulative normal distribution function ( )uφ . Since in this paper, we have used the 
logit model to perform our analysis, we will focus on this function for the derivation of the 
formulae of interaction effects if  
 
(i) 1x and 2x  are both continuous variables ; 
(ii) 1x is a continuous variable and 2x  is dummy variable. 
 
(i) If F(u) is a twice differentiable function, with the first and second derivatives denoted 
by ' ( )F u and ''( )F u being respectively the marginal effect with respect to 1x , we obtain the 
interaction effects formulae as following : 
  
2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
( )( ) ( ) [ '( ) ] [ ( ) ]E E F u u uF u f u
x x x x x x x x x x
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= = = =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
        (5) 
 
The transformation of (5) leads to:   
'
1 12 2 12 1 12 2 2 12 1
2
[ ( ).( )] ( ). ( )( ) ( )f u x f u x x f u
x
β β β β β β β∂ + = + + +
∂
                (6) 

	ABCDEF*A*
 
44 
 
For logit model where exp( )( )
1 exp( )
uF u
u
=
+
, evidence is shown that ' ( ) [ ( )][1 ( )]F u F u F u= −  and 
'' '( ) [ ( )][1 2 ( )] [ ( )][1 ( )][1 2 ( )]F u F u F u F u F u F u= − = − − .  
 
As a result,  
2
2 1
E
x x
∂
=
∂ ∂ 12 1 12 2 2 12 1.[ ( )][1 ( )] ( )( )[ ( )][1 ( )][1 2 ( )]F u F u x x F u F u F uβ β β β β− + + + − −    (7) 
 
This suggests that the interaction effect 
12
2
xx
E
∂∂
∂
 generally differs from the marginal effect 
)( 12
2
xx
E
∂
∂
 of the interaction term 12 xxw = . 
 
(ii) Assume now that 1x  is a continuous variable and 2x  is dummy variable. 
 
Consider the expected value function (4) where 1x  is a continuous variable and 2x  is dummy 
variable. 
The mixed interaction effect  )(
12 x
E
x ∂
∂
∆
∆
 can be computed as follows: 
0)(1)())(()( 2
1
2
11212
=
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
∆
∆
=
∂
∂
∆
∆
x
x
uF
x
x
uF
x
uF
xx
E
x
   (8) 
  
The transformation of (8) leads to the following expression:  
  
)()()( 11'1112211'
12
βββββββ TT xxFxxxF
x
E
x
+−+++=
∂
∂
∆
∆
  (9) 
Note however that )()(
2112 x
E
xx
E
x ∂
∂
∆
∆
≠
∂
∂
∆
∆
. 
 

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3- Interaction effects in non-linear models: the case of logit model with one high order 
terms (order 2) 
 
(i) Consider the case of logit model with one high order terms (order 2) – this the case 
for our model with the variable ‘EVI’ and ‘EVIsquare’ 
 
Instead of expectation (4), we now depart from the following expected value:  
2
1 2 1 1 1 1[ / , , ] ( ) ( )TE y x x x F x x x F uα β β= + + =                    (10) 
where 21 1 1 1
Tu x x xα β β= + + .   
 
The formula of the interaction effect is:  
2
'
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
( )( ) ( ) [ '( ) ] [( 2 ). ( )]E E F u uF u x F u
x x x x x x x x x
α β∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= = = = +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 
Hence, 
2
' ''
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
2 ( ) ( 2 ).[ ( )].E uF u x F u
x x x
β α β∂ ∂= + +
∂ ∂ ∂
 and finally,  
2
2
1 1 1 1
1 1
2 [ ( )][1 ( )] ( 2 ) [ ( )][1 ( )][1 2 ( )]E F u F u x F u F u F u
x x
β α β∂ = − + + − −
∂ ∂
       (11) 
 
(ii) Consider the case of logit model with two high order terms (order 2) – this the case 
for our model which contains the components of the variable ‘EVI’ and their squares. 
 
Instead of expectation (10), we now depart from the following expected value:  
2 2
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 12 1 2[ / , , ] ( ) ( )TE y x x x F x x x x x x x F uα α β β β β= + + + + + =     (12) 
where 2 21 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 12 1 2
Tu x x x x x x xα α β β β β= + + + + + .   
 
The interaction term of the variable 21x is obtained through the following expression: 
2
' ' 2 ''
1 1 1 12 2 1 1 1 1 12 2
1 1 1 1 1
[ '( ) ] [( 2 ). ( )] 2 . ( ) ( 2 ) ( )E uF u x x F u F u x x F u
x x x x x
α β β β α β β∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= = + + = + + +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 
Therefore, 
2
2
1 1 1 1 12 2
1 1
2 .[ ( )][1 ( )] ( 2 ) [ ( )][1 ( )][1 2 ( )]E F u F u x x F u F u F u
x x
β α β β∂ = − + + + − −
∂ ∂
   (13) 
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Similarly, the interaction term of the variable 22x is given by:  
 
2
2
2 2 2 2 12 1
2 2
2 .[ ( )][1 ( )] ( 2 ) [ ( )][1 ( )][1 2 ( )]E F u F u x x F u F u F u
x x
β α β β∂ = − + + + − −
∂ ∂
    (14). 
 
Overall, we conclude that for linear functions where uuF =)(  and where 1)(' =uF , the 
interaction effect is given by 12β , for the nonlinear function such as logit, it is always different 
from 12β , even if the model contains variables with high order terms.      
 
